Burgos vs. Chief of Staff (G.R. No. L-64261)

Facts:

On 7 December 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz-Paño, Executive Judge of the then CFI Rizal [Quezon City], issued 2 search warrants where the premises at 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the “We Forum” newspaper, were seized. A petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was filed after 6 months following the raid to question the validity of said search warrants, and to enjoin the Judge Advocate General of the AFP, the city fiscal of Quezon City, et.al. from using the articles seized as evidence in Criminal Case Q-022782 of the RTC Quezon City (People v. Burgos).

Issue:

Whether allegations of possession and printing of subversive materials may be the basis of the issuance of search warrants.

Held:

Section 3 provides that no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. In mandating that “no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce”; the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified. Herein, a statement in the effect that Burgos “is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used and are all continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under PD 885, as amended” is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant. Further, when the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice.

Trillanes vs. Pimentel (G.R. No. 179817)

FACTS:

Petitioner Trillanes IV is on trial for coup d’etat in relation to the “Oakwood Incident.” In the 2007 elections, he won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007. Petitioner now asks the Court that he be allowed to attend all official functions of the Senate, alleging mainly that his case is distinct from that of Jalosjos as his case is still pending resolution whereas that in the Jalosjos case, there was already conviction.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not valid classification between petitioner and Jalosjos exists

RULING:

The petition is bereft of merit.

In attempting to strike a distinction between his case and that of Jalosjos, petitioner chiefly points out that former Rep. Romeo Jalosjos (Jalosjos) was already convicted, albeit his conviction was pending appeal, when he filed a motion similar to petitioner's Omnibus Motion, whereas he (petitioner) is a mere detention prisoner. He asserts that he continues to enjoy civil and political rights since the presumption of innocence is still in his favor.

Further, petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos was charged with crimes involving moral turpitude, i.e., two counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness, whereas he is indicted for coup d'etat which is regarded as a "political offense."

Furthermore, petitioner justifies in his favor the presence of noble causes in expressing legitimate grievances against the rampant and institutionalized practice of graft and corruption in the AFP.

xxx

A plain reading of Jalosjos suggests otherwise, however.

The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.

It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of justice. No less than the Constitution provides:

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. (Underscoring supplied)

The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action.

That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d'etat cases, both being punishable by reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged.

In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and for release on recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court's judgment of conviction, justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal action." Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos.

xxx

Petitioner goes on to allege that unlike Jalosjos who attempted to evade trial, he is not a flight risk since he voluntarily surrendered to the proper authorities and such can be proven by the numerous times he was allowed to travel outside his place of detention.

Subsequent events reveal the contrary, however. The assailed Orders augured well when on November 29, 2007 petitioner went past security detail for some reason and proceeded from the courtroom to a posh hotel to issue certain statements. The account, dubbed this time as the "Manila Pen Incident," proves that petitioner's argument bites the dust. The risk that he would escape ceased to be neither remote nor nil as, in fact, the cause for foreboding became real.

Moreover, circumstances indicating probability of flight find relevance as a factor in ascertaining the reasonable amount of bail and in cancelling a discretionary grant of bail. In cases involving non-bailable offenses, what is controlling is the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong. Once it is established that it is so, bail shall be denied as it is neither a matter of right nor of discretion.

People vs. Jalosjos (G.R. No. 132875-76)

Facts:

The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.

Jalosjos’ primary argument is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states that the sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their representative in Congress. Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman. He calls this a covenant with his constituents made possible by the intervention of the State. He adds that it cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases.

Jalosjos further argues that on several occasions, the Regional Trial Court of Makati granted several motions to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail, for official or medical reasons.

Jalosjos avers that his constituents in the First District of Zamboanga del Norte want their voices to be heard and that since he is treated as bona fide member of the House of Representatives, the latter urges a co-equal branch of government to respect his mandate.

Issue:

Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of Representatives and to leave his cell.

Held:

To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings will virtually make him a free man.

When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office.

To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal protection.

The Constitution guarantees: "x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws." This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.

Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law?

The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison.

The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.

We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.

International School Manila Alliance of Educators vs. Quisumbing (G.R. No. 128845)

Facts:

The International School Manila (ISM), under Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. To enable the School to continue carrying out its educational program and improve its standard of instruction, Section 2(c) of the same decree authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees.

The local-hires union of the ISM were crying foul over the disparity in wages that they got compared to that of their foreign teaching counterparts.

These questions are asked to qualify a teacher into a local or foreign hire.

a.....What is one's domicile?

b.....Where is one's home economy?

c.....To which country does one owe economic allegiance?

d.....Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in the School and was the School responsible for bringing that individual to the Philippines?

Should any answer point to Philippines, the person is a local hire. The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits to the foreign hires such as housing, transportation, and 25% more pay than locals under the theory of (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure. The first was grounded on leaving his home country, the second was on the lack of tenure when he returns home.

The negotiations between the school and the union caused a deadlock between the parties. The DOLE resolved in favor of the school, while Dole Secretary Quisumbing denied the union’s motion for reconsideration He said, “The Union cannot also invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of parity. It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guarantee of equal protection of the laws is not violated by legislation or private covenants based on reasonable classification. A classification is reasonable if it is based on substantial distinctions and apply to all members of the same class. Verily, there is a substantial distinction between foreign hires and local hires, the former enjoying only a limited tenure, having no amenities of their own in the Philippines and have to be given a good compensation package in order to attract them to join the teaching faculty of the School.”

The union appealed to the Supreme Court. The petitioner called the hiring system discriminatory and racist. The school alleged that some local hires were in fact of foreign origin. They were paid local salaries.

Issue:

Whether or not the hiring system is violative of the equal protection clause.

Held:

The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor Code provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.

In this jurisdiction, there is the term “equal pay for equal work”, pertaining to persons being paid with equal salaries and have similar skills and similar conditions. There was no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires.

The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital. These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good.

For the same reason, the "dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates. The dislocation factor and limited tenure affecting foreign-hires are adequately compensated by certain benefits accorded them which are not enjoyed by local-hires, such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances.

In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires

The order of the Secretary of DOLE was reversed in sofar as giving foreign-hires higher salary.

Ormoc Sugar Central vs. Ormoc City (G.R. No. L-23794)

Facts: 

The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4 imposing “on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to USA and other foreign countries.” Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte a complaint against the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor alleging that the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity of taxation. The court rendered a decision that upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance. Hence, this appeal. 

Issue: 

Whether or not constitutional limits on the power of taxation, specifically the equal protection clause and rule of uniformity of taxation, were infringed? 

Held:

Yes. Equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where 1) it is based upon substantial distinctions; 2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; 3) the classification applies not only to present conditions, but also to future conditions substantially identical to those present; and 4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class. A perusal of the requisites shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time the ordinance was enacted, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. Was the only sugar central in the City of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central for the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to a tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. As the entity to be levied upon.

Wherefore, the decision appealed was reversed.

People vs. Cayat (G.R. No. L-45987)

FACTS:

The accused, Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province was sentenced by the justice of the peace of court of Baguio for violation of Act No. 1639 (secs. 2 and 3)

SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any native of the Philippine Islands who is a member of a non-Christian tribe within the meaning of the Act Numbered Thirteen hundred and ninety-seven, to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act, except as provided in section one hereof; and it shall be the duty of any police officer or other duly authorized agent of the Insular or any provincial, municipal or township government to seize and forthwith destroy any such liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any member of a non-Christian tribe.

SEC. 3. Any person violating the provisions of section one or section two of this Act shall, upon conviction thereof, be punishable for each offense by a fine of not exceeding two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, in the discretion of the court.

At the trial, cayat admitted all the facts alleged in the information  that on or about the January 25, 1937, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the accused, Cayat, being a member of the non-Christian tribes, did receive, acquire, and have in his possession and under his control or custody, one bottle of A gin, an intoxicating liquor, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of Act No. 1639, but pleaded not guilty to the charge for the reasons adduced in his demurrer and submitted the case on the pleadings. The trial court found him guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him,

The case was appealed and the accused challenges the constitutionality of the Act on the following ground:

(1) That it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws;

Issue:

WON the Act violates the equal protection of the laws

WON the Act violates due process of law

WON it is an invalid exercise of police power

Held:

The Legislature has passed Act No. 1639 undoubtedly to secure for them the blessings of peace and harmony; to facilitate, and not to mar, their rapid and steady march to civilization and culture. It is, therefore, in this light that the Act must be understood and applied.

It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable, 

(1) Must rest on substantial distinctions; 

(2) Must be germane to the purposes of the law; 

(3) Must not be limited to existing conditions only; and 

(4) Must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real and substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon "accident of birth or parentage, but upon the degree of civilization and culture.

"The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way, to the geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities."

The Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes. The exceptional cases of certain members thereof who at present have reached a position of cultural equality with their Christian brothers, cannot affect the reasonableness of the classification thus established.

That it is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. The prohibition "to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act.

It is designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-Christian tribes. It has been the sad experience of the past, as the observations of the lower court disclose, that the free use of highly intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standard of life and civilization.

The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exist.

Appellants contends that that provision of the law empowering any police officer or other duly authorized agent of the government to seize and forthwith destroy any prohibited liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any member of the non-Christian tribes is violative of the due process of law provided in the Constitution. To constitute due process of law, notice and hearing are not always necessary. This rule is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officials in applying a law to particular cases. Due process of law means simply: (1) that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the government; (2) that it shall be reasonable in its operation; (3) that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and (4) that it shall be applicable alike to all citizens of the state or to all of the class. Thus, a person's property may be seized by the government in payment of taxes without judicial hearing; or property used in violation of law may be confiscated or when the property constitutes corpus delicti.

Neither is the Act an improper exercise of the police power of the state. It has been said that the police power is the most insistent and least limitable of all powers of the government. It has been aptly described as a power coextensive with self protection and constitutes the law of overruling necessity. Any measure intended to promote the health, peace, morals, education and good order of the people or to increase the industries of the state, develop its resources and add to its wealth and prosperity is a legitimate exercise of the police power, unless shown to be whimsical or capricious as to unduly interfere with the rights of an individual, the same must be upheld.

Act No. 1639, as above stated, is designed to promote peace and order in the non Christian tribes so as to remove all obstacles to their moral and intellectual growth and, eventually, to hasten their equalization and unification with the rest of their Christian brothers. Its ultimate purpose can be no other than to unify the Filipino people with a view to a greater Philippines.

Judgment is affirmed.

Alauya vs. COMELEC (G.R. Nos. 152151-52)

Facts:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order to nullify the Orders of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC for brevity) en banc dated January 2, 2002 and February 19, 2002 in SPA Nos. 01454 and 01455 (ARMM). The January 2, 2002 Order directed the Provincial Board of Canvassers not to proclaim the winning candidates for regional assemblyman in the 2nd District of Lanao del Sur, while the February 19, 2002 Order denied the motion to dismiss SPA Nos. 01454 and 01455 (ARMM).

There was a petition to declare a failure of election in Lumbatan and in the 5 municipalities of Madalum, Madamba, Sultan Gumander, Bacolod Kalawi, and Bayang of the province of Lanao del Sur because of massive substitute voting in these 5 municipalities. Petitioner Tamano claimed that in almost all of the precincts in these 5 municipalities, either petitioner Saaddudin M. Alauya, Jr. (Alauya for brevity) or private respondent Usman T. Sarangani (Sarangani for brevity) obtained 100% of the votes such that their votes equalled the total number of registered voters. Tamano prayed for the suspension of proclamation of the winning candidates. Alauya filed his Answer with Motion to Dismiss. Sarangani filed his Answer and Opposition to the Suspension of Proclamation. 

The special elections in Lumbatan proceeded as scheduled on January 7, 2002. The Provincial Board of Canvassers canvassed the election returns. The results of the canvass of Lumbatan and of the other 20 municipalities showed Menor as the No. 1 winning candidate followed by Sarangani in the No. 2 spot and Alauya in the No. 3 spot, The COMELEC en banc issued the order directing the Provincial Board of Canvassers NOT to proclaim the alleged or supposed winners and to continue and complete the canvass of election results in the Second District of Lanao del Sur.

Alauya filed a Motion to Lift Suspension of Proclamation with the COMELEC. Alauaya subsequently ffiled a TRO with SC. the Court issued a temporary restraining order directing the COMELEC to CEASE and DESIST from implementing the order of January 7, 2002 in SPA No. 01454 and SPA No. 01455 which suspended the proclamation insofar only as the petitioner (Alauya) is concerned. Based on the restraining order of the Court, the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed Alauya who took his oath and has already assumed the position of Regional Assemblyman of the Regional Legislative Assembly of the ARMM.

Meanwhile, Sarangani filed his comment joining Alauya in his petition praying for the setting aside of the subject COMELEC orders. Specifically, Sarangani prays that the order suspending proclamation be extended to him so he may also take his oath and assume office as regional assembly member.

Issue:

WON the Order dated January 7, 2002 was issued in violation of due process of law.

Held:

Alauya claims that the COMELEC did not notify him of any hearing conducted prior to the issuance of the order dated January 7, 2002 in violation of Section 242[1] which requires notice and hearing prior to the suspension of proclamation.

A party cannot successfully invoke deprivation of due process if he was accorded the opportunity of a hearing, through either oral arguments or pleadings.There is no denial of due process when a party is given an opportunity through his pleadings.

We find no breach of Alauyas right to due process. Contrary to Alauyas claim, it appears that notices dated December 21, 2001 were given to all concerned parties requiring them to file their answer to the petition and setting the case for hearing on January 4, 2002. In an Order dated January 4, 2002, the COMELEC noted that Alauya did not appear during the hearing. Subsequently, Alauya filed his Answer with Motion to Dismiss to the petitions. Verily, Alauya was given an opportunity to be heard during the hearing held on January 4, 2002 which he failed to attend and was in fact heard through the pleadings he filed with the COMELEC.

Wherefore, the petition is DISMISSED.

Guzman vs. NU (G.R. No. L-68288)

Facts:

Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo and Ariel Ramacula, students of respondent National University, have come to this Court to seek relief from what they describe as their school's "continued and persistent refusal to allow them to enrol." In their petition "for extraordinary legal and equitable remedies with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction" dated August 7, 1984, they alleged that they were denied due process due to the fact that they were active participants in peaceful mass actions within the premises of the University.

The respondents on the other hand claimed that the petitioners’ failure to enroll for the first semester of the school year 1984-1985 is due to their own fault and not because of their alleged exercise of their constitutional and human rights. That as regards to Guzman, his academic showing was poor due to his activities in leading boycotts of classes. That Guzman “is facing criminal charges for malicious mischief before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila in connection with the destruction of properties of respondent University. The petitioners have “failures in their records, and are not of good scholastic standing.”

Issue: 

WON the petitioners were denied due process.

Held:

Immediately apparent from a reading of respondents' comment and memorandum is the fact that they had never conducted proceedings of any sort to determine whether or not petitioners-students had indeed led or participated "in activities within the university premises, conducted without prior permit from school authorities, that disturbed or disrupted classes therein" 3 or perpetrated acts of "vandalism, coercion and intimidation, slander, noise barrage and other acts showing disdain for and defiance of University authority." 4 Parenthetically, the pendency of a civil case for damages and a criminal case for malicious mischief against petitioner Guzman, cannot, without more, furnish sufficient warrant for his expulsion or debarment from re-enrollment. Also apparent is the omission of respondents to cite this Court to any duly published rule of theirs by which students may be expelled or refused re-enrollment for poor scholastic standing. 

The school had violated the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools that “no penalty shall be imposed upon any student except for cause as defined in the manual and/or in the school rules and regulations as duly promulgated and only after due investigation shall have been conducted.

There are standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and these are, that

(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them;

(2) they shag have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired;

(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;

(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and

(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.

THE PETITION WAS GRANTED AND THE RESPONDENTS ARE DIRECTED TO ALLOW THE PETITIONERS TO RE-ENROLL WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ANY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.

Mejia vs. Pamaran (G.R. No. L-56741-42)

Facts:

6 ejectment cases were filed separately in the City Court of Manila by Eusebio Lu against Feliciano F. Endangan, Josefina Meimban, Teodorico Bontia, Rolando Antillon, Jose Mabalot and Vicente Villamor. All cases were decided by the City Court of Manila against Endangan, et. al., all of whom appealed in due time to the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila, where the cases were raffled to Branch XXVI, presided over by the Honorable Jose P. Alejandro. 

On 12 August 1979, Endangan, Bontia, Antillon, Mabalot, and Villamor entered into a compromise agreement with Lu whereby the Endangan, et. al. individually received from Lu the sum of P5,000 in consideration of which Endangan, et. al. agreed to vacate the premises in question and remove their houses therefrom within 60 days from the date of the execution of the agreement, failing which the appellee shall have the authority to demolish Endangan, et. al.'s houses with costs thereof chargeable against them. The compromise agreement was submitted to the court. Josefina Meimban did not join her co-defendants in entering into the compromise agreement. Up to that stage of the cases.

In July 1979, Meimban went to Court where she met Atty. Mejia who told her that the case has not yet been decided because there was still one party who has not signed the compromise agreement prepared by Atty. Doron. Atty. Mejia also remarked that she was surprised why rich people were helping in that case, like a certain Atty. Lu, a brother of Eusebio Lu, who has been approaching the presiding judge; and then told her she would help them provided they give P1,000 each for a gift to the Judge

They were able to give partial amount of the money being asked. Atty. Mejia also attempted to bribe the Tanodbayan Investigator (Christina Corall-Paterno), through intricate gold chain with a pendant hearing an inscription of letter "C," which the investigator returned through an employee. Corall-Paterno investigated the complaints of Josefina Meimban and Pilar Bautista against Atty. Aurora Mejia for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. On 23 April 1981, the Sandiganbayan, Mejia was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of paragraph (b), Section 3 of RA 3019 and sentenced her to an indeterminate imprisonment ranging from 4 years and 1 day as minimum to 7 years as maximum, to suffer perpetual disqualification from public office and to indemnify the victim Josefina Meimban the sum of P1,000.00 representing the money given to her. The Sandiganbayan also found Mejia, in Criminal Case 1989, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of paragraph (b), Section 3 of RA 3019 and likewise sentenced her to an indeterminate imprisonment ranging from 4 years and 1 day as minimum to 7 years as maximum, to suffer perpetual disqualification from public office and to indemnify the victim Pilar Bautista the amount of P500 representing the money given to her. Mejia was also ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings. Mejia filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court. 

Mejia contended that the proceedings taken by respondent Sandiganbayan in the case at bar is void ab initio. She argued that only one stage of appeal is available to the petitioner under PD No. 1606 which effectively deprives her of the intermediate recourse to the Court of Appeals and that in said appeal to this Court, only issues of law may be raised and worse still the appeal has become a matter of discretion rather than a matter of right. Petitioner contends this is a denial of the equal protection of the law.

Issue:

WON the accused is denied of due process and the equal protection of the law.

Held:

There is no denial of equal protection of the law. The classification satisfies the test announced by this Court through Justice Laurel in People v. Vera requiring that it must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class. To repeat, the Constitution specifically makes the urgency of which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows that those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back as January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a different procedure for the accused therein, is not necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

There is no violation of due process. What is required for compliance with the due process mandate in criminal proceedings? This Court with Justice Tuason as ponente, succinctly Identified it with a "a fair and impartial trial and reasonable opportunity for the preparation of defense. In criminal proceedings then, due process is satisfied if the accused is "informed as to why he is proceeded against and what charge he hall to meet, with his conviction being made to rest on evidence that is not tainted with falsity after full opportunity for him to rebut it and the sentence being implied in accordance with a valid law. It is assumed, of course, that the court that rendered the decision is one of competent jurisdiction. Thus: This court has had frequent occasion to consider the requirements of due process of law as applied to criminal procedure, and, generally speaking, it may be said that if an accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction, and proceeded against under the orderly processes of law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority of a constitutional law, then he has had due process of law.

Secretary of Justice vs. Judge Lantion (G.R. No. 139465)

FACTS:

On January 13, 1977, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1069 “Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country”. The Decree is founded on: the Doctrine of Incorporation under the Constitution; the mutual concern for the suppression of crime both in the state where it was committed and the state where the criminal may have escaped. On November 13, 1994, Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the “Extradition Treaty between the Government of the Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A.” The Philippine Senate ratified the said Treaty. On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States. Mark Jimenez was charged of multiple crimes ranging from tax evasion to wire tapping to conspiracy to defraud the USA. Jimenez was then wanted in the US. The US government, pursuant to the RP-US extradition treaty requested to have Jimenez be extradited there. Jimenez requested for a copy of the complaint against him as well as the extradition request by the USA.The DOJ secretary:

1. refused to provide him copy thereof advising that it is still premature to give him so and that it is not a preliminary investigation hence he is not entitled to receive such copies;

2. denied the request for the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7that the Philippine Government must present the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.

Jimenez sued the DOJ Secretary (Franklin Drilon). The lower court ruled in favor of Jimenez. Hence, this petition.

Issue: 

WON Jimenez was deprived of due process.

Held:

Yes. Section 2(a) of PD 1086 defines extradition as “the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government.” Although the inquisitorial power exercised by the DOJ as an administrative agency due to the failure of the DFA to comply lacks any judicial discretion, it primarily sets the wheels for the extradition process which may ultimately result in the deprivation of the liberty of the prospective extraditee. This deprivation can be effected at two stages: 

1. The provisional arrest of the prospective extraditee pending the submission of the request & 

2. The temporary arrest of the prospective extradite during the pendency of the extradition petition in court. 

Clearly, there’s an impending threat to a prospective extraditee’s liberty as early as during the evaluation stage. Because of such consequences, the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets off or commences the procedure for & ultimately the deprivation of liberty of a prospective extradite. In essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. The Court has ruled in other cases that where the investigation of an administrative proceeding may result in forfeiture of life, liberty, or property, the administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or penal, & such forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. In the case at bar, similar to a preliminary investigation, the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings which may result in the filing of an information against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, & to the deprivation of his liberty. Thus, the extraditee must be accorded due process rights of notice & hearing according to A3 §14(1) & (2), as well as A3 §7—the right of the people to information on matters of public concern & the corollary right to access to official records & documents.

The basic rights of notice & hearing are applicable in criminal, civil & administrative proceedings. Non-observance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting their interests, & upon notice, may claim the right to appear therein & present their side.

In view of the foregoing premises, the petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. 

Fabella vs. CA (G.R. No. 110379)

FACTS:

On September 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Carino issued a return-to-work order to all public school teachers who had participated in walk-outs and strikes on various dates during the period of September to October 1990. The mass action had been staged to demand payment of 13th month pay, allowances and passage of debt cap bill in Congress. On October 1990, Secretary Carino filed administrative cases against respondents, who are teachers of Mandaluyong High School. The charge sheets required respondents to explain in writing why they should not be punished for having taken part in the mass action in violation of civil service laws. Administrative hearings started on December 1990. Respondents, through counsel assailed the legality of the proceedings on the following due process grounds: first, they were not given copies of the guidelines adopted by the committee for the investigation and denied access to evidence; second, the investigation placed the burden of proof on respondents to prove their innocence; third, that the investigating body was illegally constituted, their composition and appointment violated Sec.9 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. Pending the action assailing the validity of the administrative proceedings, the investigating committee rendered a decision finding the respondents guilty and ordered their immediate dismissal. The respondents filed an injunctive suit and a petition of certiorari and mandamus with RTC and were denied. They went with the SC which ruled for the reinstatement of the action. RTC then granted their petition. CA affirmed such grant by the RTC. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not private respondents were denied due process?

HELD:

YES. In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent’s legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected. 

The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, which specifically covers administrative proceedings involving public schoolteachers. Section 9 of said law expressly provides that the committee to hear public schoolteachers’ administrative cases should be composed of the school superintendent of the division as chairman, a representative of the local or any existing provincial or national teachers’ organization and a supervisor of the division. In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to hear the administrative charges against private respondents did not include “a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teacher’s organization” as required by Section 9 of RA 4670. Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have no competent jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily void. They could not provide any basis for the suspension or dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion of a representative of a teachers’ organization in these committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal. It was this requirement that would have given substance and meaning to the right to be heard. Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard. 

Other minor issues: Petitioners allege that Sec 9 of RA 4670 was complied with because the respondents are members of Quezon City Teachers Federation. We disagree. Mere membership of said teachers in their respective teachers’ organizations does not ipso facto make them authorized representatives of such organizations as contemplated by Section 9 of RA 4670. Under this section, the teachers’ organization possesses the right to indicate its choice of representative to be included by the DECS in the investigating committee. Such right to designate cannot be usurped by the secretary of education or the director of public schools or their underlings. In the instant case, there is no dispute that none of the teachers appointed by the DECS as members of its investigating committee was ever designated or authorized by a teachers’ organization as its representative in said committee. 

Thus, the dismissal of the teachers is not justified, it being arbitrary and violative of the teacher’s right to due process.

Petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.

RUBEN SERRANO vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ISETANN DEPARTMENT STORE (G.R. No. 117040)

Facts:

Ruben Serrano was the head of the security checkers section of Isetann Department Store. He was charged with the task of supervising security checkers in their jobs. On October 11, 1991, the management sent him a letter immediately terminating his services as security section head, effective on the same day. The reason given by the management was “retrenchment”; they had opted to hire an independent security agency as a cost-cutting measure. Serrano filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal layoff, Unjust Labor Practices, underpayment of wages and nonpayment of salary and OT pay with the LA.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of Serrano. It stated that Isetann failed to establish that it had retrenched its security division, that the petitioner was not accorded due process, etc. and even stated that the day after Serrano’s dismissal, Isetann employed a safety and security supervisor with similar duties to that of the former.

The NLRC on the other hand reversed the LA but ordered Isetann to pay separation pay equivalent to one month per year of service, unpaid salary, et al. It held that the phase-out of the security section was a valid exercise of management prerogative on the part of Isetann, for which the NLRC cannot substitute its judgment in the absence of bad faith or abuse of discretion on the part of the latter; and that the security and safety supervisor’s position was long in place prior to Serrano’s separation from the company, or the phase-out of the Security Section.

Issue:

WON the petitioner’s dismissal was illegal.

Held:

No. The Court held that the dismissal was due to an authorized cause under Art. 283 of the Labor Code, i.e. redundancy. However, while an authorized cause exists, Isetann failed to follow the procedural requirement provided by Art. 283 of LC. For termination due to authorized causes, the employer must give a written notice of termination to the employee concerned and to the DOLE at least 30 days prior to its effectivity. This Isetann failed to do.

The question now arises as to whether the failure of Isetann to comply with the procedural requirements renders the dismissal invalid, or, in the event that it is valid, what the appropriate sanction or penalty must be meted out.

Prior to the doctrine laid down in the decision rendered in Wenphil Corp.NLRC in 1989, the termination of an employee, even for just cause but without following the requisite procedure, renders such dismissal illegal, and therefore null and void.

In the Wenphil doctrine, this was reversed; the said rule was unjust to employers. Instead, the dismissal was held to be still valid but the employer was sanctioned by way of the payment of indemnity (damages) – in that case, P1,000. The amount of indemnity will be depended on the circumstances of each case, taking into account the gravity of the offense committed by the employer.

Now, the Court once again examines the Wenphil doctrine. Puno says that the effect of the Wenphil doctrine was such that there has been a “dismiss now, pay later” policy where the employers were able to circumvent the procedural requisites of termination, which is more convenient than the compliance with the 30-day notice. Panganiban said that the monetary sanctions were too insignificant, niggardly, sometimes even late. Both justices are of the opinion that the deprivation of due process which must be accorded to the employee renders the dismissal illegal.

The present ruling of the Court held that the dismissal of the employee is merely ineffectual, not void. The dismissal was upheld but it is ineffectual. The sanction provided was the payment of back wages from the time of dismissal up to the decision of the court finding just or authorized cause. This was thought to balance the interests of both parties, recognizing the employee’s right to notice and at the same time the right of the employer to dismiss for any of the just and authorized causes.

The Court also responded to the arguments of Justices Puno and Panganiban by stating that the violation in the procedural requirement of termination is not a denial of the fundamental right to due process. This is because of the ff reasons:

1.) The due process clause is a limitation on governmental powers,inapplicable to the exercise of private power, such as in this case. The provision “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty and property without due process of law” pertains only to the State, as only it has the authority to do the same.

2.) The purpose of the notice and hearing under the Due process clause is to provide an opportunity for the employee to be heard before the power of the organized society is brought upon the individual. Under Art. 283, however, the purpose is to give him time to prepare for the eventual loss of his job and for DOLE to determine whether economic causes exist to justify termination.It is not to give opportunity to be heard – there is no charge against the employee under Art. 283.

3.) The employer cannot be expected to be an impartial judge of his own cause.

4.) Not all notice requirements are requisites of due process. Some are simply a part of a procedure to be followed before a right granted to party can be exercised.

5.) Art. 279 of the LC provides that only dismissal without just or authorized cause renders such dismissal illegal. To consider termination without observing procedural requirements as also illegal dismissal is to add another ground for ID, thereby amending Art. 279.

In this case, the separation pay was a distinct award from the payment of back wages as a way of penalty. 

Petition was denied.

City of Manila vs. Judge Laguio (G.R. No. 118127)

Facts:

The private respondent, Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTOC) is a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels, and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel.

March 30, 1993 - City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim approved an ordinance enacted which prohibited certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community. The Ordinance prohibited the establishment of sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, beerhouses, night clubs, day clubs, cabarets, motels, inns. Owners and operators of the enumerated establishments are given three months to wind up business operations or transfer to any place outside Ermita-Malate or convert said businesses to other kinds allowable within the area. The Ordinance also provided that in case of violation and conviction, the premises of the erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently.

June 28, 1993 - MTOC filed a Petition with the lower court, praying that the Ordinance, insofar as it included motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional for several reasons but mainly because it is not a valid exercise of police power and it constitutes a denial of equal protection under the law.

Judge Laguio ruled for the petitioners. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

WON the Ordinance is constitutional.

Held:

SC held that the ordinance is unconstitutional for several reasons.

First, it did not meet the valid exercise of police power. To successfully invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that (1)the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights, but (2)the means employed must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive. The object of the ordinance was the promotion and protection of the social and moral values of the community. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion into businesses allowed under the ordinance have no reasonable relation to its purpose. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and promote social and moral welfare of the community. It will not itself eradicate prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.

Second. The modality employed constitutes unlawful taking. The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially divests the respondent of the beneficial use of its property. The ordinance forbids running of the enumerated businesses in Ermita-Malate area and instructs owners/operators to wind up their business operations or to transfer outside the area or convert said business into allowed business. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation. It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals. There are two types of taking: A “possessory” taking and a “regulatory” taking. The latter occurs when the government’s regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property, as in this case.

Third. The ordinance violates the equal protection clause. Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to the rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some. Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation provided the classification is reasonable. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1)It must be based on substantial distinction; (2)It must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3)It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4)It must apply equally to all members of the class. In the Court’s view, there are no substantial distinction between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments providing lodging and usually meals and other services for the public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside this area. A noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if located outside the area.

Fourth. The ordinance is repugnant to general laws, thus it is ultra vires. The ordinance is in contravention of the Revised Administrative Code as the Code merely empowers the local government units to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated. Not only that, it likewise runs counter to the provisions of P.D. 499. The P.D. Had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment and operation of all kinds of commercial establishments.

Wherefore, the petition was DENIED and the decision of the RTC was AFFIRMED.

Ang Tibay vs. CIR (G.R. No. L-46496)

Facts:

Ang Tibay was a manufacturer of rubber slippers. There was a shortage of leather soles, and it was necessary to temporarily lay off members of the National Labor Union. According to the Union however, this was merely a scheme to systematically terminate the employees from work, and that the shortage of soles is unsupported. It claims that Ang Tibay is guilty of unjust labor practice because the owner, Teodoro, is discriminating against the National Labor Union, and unjustly favoring the National Workers Brotherhood, which was allegedly sympathetic to the employer. The Court of Industrial Relation decided the case and elevated it to the Supreme Court, but a motion for new trial was raised by the NLU. But the Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said motion. 

The motion for new trial was raised because according to NLU, there are documents that are so inaccessible to them that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. That these documents, which NLU have now attached as exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered therein.

Issue:

WON the union was denied due process by CIR.

Held:

To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR. The CIR is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation which is the Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the CIR, as will appear from perusal of its organic law is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or disputes arising between, and/ or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulates the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of CA 103.

SC had the occasion to point out that the CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.

The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:

(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and submit evidence in support thereof;

(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;

(3) The decision must have something to support itself;

(4) The evidence must be substantial;

(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;

(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate;

(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.

SC said there was a failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved due to failure to receive all relevant evidence. Thus, the motion for a new trial was granted and the entire record of this case is remanded to the CIR.

Balacuit vs. CFI (G.R. No. L-38429)

FACTS:

This involves a Petition for Review questioning the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No.640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969, penalizing any person, group of persons, entity or corporation engaged in the business of selling admission tickets to any movie or other public exhibitions, games, contests or other performances to require children between 7 and 12years of age to pay full payment for tickets intended for adults but should charge only one-half of the said ticket.Petitioners who are managers of theaters, affected by the ordinance, filed a Complaint before the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City docketed as Special Civil No. 237 on June 30,1969, praying that the subject ordinance be declared unconstitutional and, therefore, void and unenforceable. The Court rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 640 of the City of Butuan constitutional and valid.

ISSUE:

Whether Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan is valid and constitutional and was the Ordinance a valid exercise of police power.

HELD:

It is already settled that the operation of theaters, cinematographs and other places of public exhibition are subject to regulation by the municipal council in the exercise of delegated police power by the local government. However, to invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that the interest of the public generally requires an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interest, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other words, the determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police power is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the courts.

The Court likewise ruled in the negative as to the question of the subject ordinance being a valid exercise of police power. While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. The proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their property in their own way, to fix what prices of admission they think most for their own advantage, and that any person who did not approve could stay away.

The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court in Special Civil Case No. 237 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 640 unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void. This decision is immediately executory.