People of the Philippines vs. Pomar (G.R. No. L-22008)

Facts:

Julio Pomar, the manager and person - in charge of La Flor de la Isabela, a tobacco factory pertaining to La Campania General de Tabacos de Filipinas, a corporation duly authorized to transact business in Manila, employed Macaria Fajardo as cigar-maker. She was granted a vacation leave beginning July 16, 1923 by reason of pregnancy. 

On October 26, 1923 a case was filed against defendant Pomar for failing to pay Fajardo her regular wages corresponding to 30 days before and 30 days after her delivery and confinement, in accordance with the provision of Act. 3071 which states that; 

“Section 13-Every person, firm or corporation owning or managing a factory, shop or place of labor of any description shall be obliged to grant to any woman employed by it as laborer who may be pregnant, thirty days vacation with pay before and another thirty days after confinement: Provided, That the employer shall not discharge such laborer without just cause, under the penalty of being required to pay to her wages equivalent to the total of two months counted from the day of her discharge.”

The judge found the defendant guilty of the alleged offense. From that sentence, the defendant appealed contending that his act did not constitute any offense because such provision of the Act No. 3071 is unconstitutional.

Issue:

Whether or not the provisions of sections 13 and 15 of Act No. 3071 are a reasonable and lawful exercise of the police power of the state

Held:

Said section 13 was enacted by the Legislature of the Philippine Islands in the exercise of its supposed police power, with the praiseworthy purpose of safeguarding the health of pregnant women laborers in "factory, shop or place of labor of any description," and of insuring to them, to a certain extent, reasonable support for one month before and one month after their delivery. 

The statute now under consideration is attacked upon the ground that it authorizes an unconstitutional interference with the freedom of contract including within the guarantees of the due process clause of the 5th Amendment. That the right to contract about one's affairs is a part of the liberty of the individual protected by this clause is settled by the decision of this court, and is no longer open to question. The law takes account of the necessities of only one party to the contract. It ignores the necessities of the employer by compelling him to pay not less than a certain sum, not only whether the employee is capable of earning it, but irrespective of the ability of his business to sustain the burden, generously leaving him, of course, the privilege of abandoning his business as an alternative for going on at a loss. Liberty includes not only the right to labor, but to refuse to labor, and, consequently, the right to contract to labor or for labor, and to terminate such contracts, and to refuse to make such contracts.. Hence, we are of the opinion that this Act contravenes those provisions of the state and Federal constitutions, which guarantee that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.

Clearly, therefore, the law has deprived, every person, firm, or corporation owning or managing a factory, shop or place of labor of any description within the Philippine Islands, of his right to enter into contracts of employment upon such terms as he and the employee may agree upon. The law creates a term in every such contract, without the consent of the parties. Such persons are, therefore, deprived of their liberty to contract. The constitution of the Philippine Islands guarantees to every citizen his liberty and one of his liberties is the liberty to contract. It has been decided in a long line of decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, that the right to contract about one's affairs is a part of the liberty of the individual, protected by the "due process of law" clause of the constitution. The rule in this jurisdiction is, that the contracting parties may establish any agreements, terms, and conditions they may deem advisable, provided they are not contrary to law, morals or public policy. (Art. 1255, Civil Code.) 

For all of the foregoing reasons, we are fully persuaded, under the facts and the law, that the provisions of section 13, of Act No. 3071 of the Philippine Legislature, are unconstitutional and void, in that they violate and are contrary to the provisions of the first paragraph of section 3 of the Act of Congress of the United States of August 29, 1916. (Vol. 12, Public Laws, p. 238.)